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Rejoinder
Donald B. Rubin
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to respond
to these three complementary discussions written by
Edward L. Korn (ELK), Paul R. Rosenbaum (PRR)
and Stephen E. Fienberg (SEF), each of whom has
made substantial contributions to problems of causal
inference. Thanks to all three for the generosity ex-
pressed in their comments. I am in agreement with
many points raised by them, but there are a few
places where we may not fully agree, possibly due
to misunderstandings.
ELK
ELK’s ordering of problems by their importance,
displayed in his Figure 1, is difficult to dispute. I like
to think of there being a continuum in causal infer-
ence from perfect randomized experiments to sloppy
observational studies, and I like to “chip away” at
all points in the continuum because I often feel that
there is potentially a tremendous transfer of insights
from work on one problem to work on another. For
a specific example, the work on noncompliance pre-
sented in Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) led to
the general principal stratification framework in Fran-
gakis and Rubin (2002), which provided a formal
structure for embedding the resolution of the “cen-
soring/truncation due to death” problem used a
decade earlier in the context of an actual FDA sub-
mission, as noted in Rubin (1998, 2000) and the tar-
get article.
ELK’s examples are highly appropriate and of-
fer strong support for the importance of working in
the context of real problems. I particularly liked his
orthodontic example from Korn, Teeter and Baum-
rind (2001), and think that generalizations of the
idea used there could be quite fruitful, especially
because that idea implies specific suggestions for im-
provements to the design of particular types of ob-
servational studies. ELK is correct that when the
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principal strata are effectively observed, as in that
example, distributional assumptions, such as nor-
mality, can be avoided.
As pointed out in Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)
and its rejoinder, the focus of our analysis of non-
compliance is on the units in this experiment who
would comply when assigned either treatment. This
group is, by definition, the only collection of units
in this experiment who can be observed receiving
and not receiving the treatment, and thus is the
only collection of units providing any data about
the causal effect of receiving versus not receiving the
treatment. The always-takers are always observed
receiving the treatment, and the never-takers are
never observed receiving the treatment, and thus
data from neither of these latter two groups pro-
vides any evidence about the effect of taking versus
not taking the treatment. In other words, in this ex-
periment “efficacy” can only be estimated for the
compliers. “Effectiveness” is a joint property of (a)
efficacy for the compliers, (b) how the treatment is
“marketed” (i.e., how compliance is enforced) and
(c) “placebo” effects of assignment on the noncom-
pliers (i.e., the always-takers and the never-takers).
This point is discussed at length in Sheiner and Ru-
bin (1995).
Consequently, the emphasis within the principal
stratification framework is on separately estimating
efficacy and the other components of effectiveness,
in order to help the generalization to other situa-
tions with possibly different placebo effects or differ-
ent marketing effects. Thus I am puzzled by ELK’s
statement that the principal stratification approach
“. . . negates one of the usual reasons for being inter-
ested in efficacy and not effectiveness. . . ”—quite the
opposite in my mind, but perhaps I misunderstood
his meaning.
PRR
I do understand ELK’s desire to avoid the entire
problem of censoring due to death in the quality-of-
life example by assigning the lowest possible QOL
score to those who are dead, but as I have argued,
this approach, to me, mixes up issues of (a) estimat-
ing the scientific effect of a treatment intervention
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in groups of units where it can estimated and (b) in-
dividual value judgments about the value of death
versus various qualities of life. PRR seems to agree,
even providing a Seneca quote in support! If we ac-
cept ELK’s suggestion to use, for example, a rank-
sum test, it seems an approach such as the one ad-
vocated by PRR is quite attractive because it avoids
having to make a particular choice of a single value
for the QOL of someone who is dead, common for
everyone, and thus PRR’s approach allows diverg-
ing patient preference orderings of death relative to
different qualities of life.
As is typical with PRR’s contributions, I find his
proposal deep and creative. I do wonder, however,
about its implications for applied consumers of such
data, such as doctors or patients. PRR’s proposal
does avoid the need for distributional assumptions,
noted by ELK and presented in my Section 6, but
the proposal seems to replace them with confidence
intervals for estimands that may not be as easily un-
derstood, that is, for the order statistics that would
have been observed if all n treated subjects had in-
stead received control. Despite the undeniable math-
ematical elegance of the approach, and the clear ex-
position conveyed especially by the subsequent ex-
amples, my sympathies continue to be with what I
view as the more direct Bayesian model-based for-
mulation. But this preference may be largely a mat-
ter of taste and differing experiences.
Also, to some extent I realize that this view about
PRR’s proposal being difficult to convey to con-
sumers may be unfair because the unfamiliar is nearly
always seen as more challenging, and I look forward
to seeing a family of work evolving from this inter-
esting idea. For example, what would this approach
have to say about the simpler noncompliance prob-
lem, in particular when we impose the no-defier as-
sumption, but we do not impose the exclusion re-
strictions for both always-takers and never-takers,
as in Hirano et al. (2000)?
SEF
SEF points out that my article largely avoided the
use of formal notation and equations, in contrast
to some of my earlier work. I agree with SEF that
such formality is the best way to nail down intuitive
ideas, but I think that we also agree that sometimes
informal exposition works better for conveying the
underlying ideas to less technical audiences. The lec-
tures on which this paper was based were delivered
in the late afternoon to large audiences, which in-
cluded nonstatistical relatives of Morrie and Morris,
and I did not want to put them to sleep! I hope that,
if the words in the written version are not precise
enough to convey critical ideas clearly, the technical
references given will make up for any deficiencies.
Regarding terminology, for years I have avoided
the use of “counterfactuals” to describe “potential
outcomes” for two major reasons. First, at the de-
sign phase, no well-defined potential outcome is coun-
terfactual, although there do exist a priori counter-
factuals, such as the value of an outcome when ex-
posed to treatment for a never-taker who will never
be exposed to the treatment no matter the assign-
ments. Second, at the analysis phase, at least some
of the potential outcomes are factual. I agree with
SEF’s preference for making all potential outcomes
random variables, as I did in Rubin (1975, 1978).
But to bridge the Bayesian potential outcomes frame-
work to non-Bayesians, it is important to recognize
that in Neyman’s original formulation, which is the
classical randomization-based formulation still used
by many, if not most, statisticians today, for exam-
ple by PRR, the potential outcomes are not random
variables; instead the potential outcomes are treated
as “. . . fixed features of the finite population of N
subjects.” In this approach, only the randomization
indicator is a random variable.
SEF’s plea at the conclusion of his Section 2 ar-
gues for formality of causal inference using graphi-
cal models and, as stated earlier, I certainly agree
that having more formality available is better (as
in the full Bayesian approach to noncompliance de-
veloped in Imbens and Rubin, 1997). However, as
pointed out in Rubin (2004)—including in my re-
joinder to Lauritzen (2004), for causal inference I
find the graphical approach more ambiguous and
more confusing, as well as less flexible and less for-
mal, than the potential outcomes approach. But
maybe this too is simply a matter of differing tastes.
An aspect of SEF’s discussion that I find puz-
zling is his comment about the “average causal effect
(ACE),” and his implication that in Rubin (1978) I
focused on the ACE and justified randomization to
a Bayesian using the ACE. But that Annals article
was devoted to discussing the full posterior predic-
tive distribution of all the potential outcomes, from
which all Bayesian causal inferences follow, no mat-
ter how the causal effects are defined; for example,
see (4.1) in that article. And in Rubin (1974, pages
690–694) I pointed out that the use of the average
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causal effect was rather arbitrary but convenient for
frequentist justifications for randomization based on
unbiased estimation over the randomization distri-
bution, and I noted the possible use of the median or
mid-mean instead (page 690). Over the years, many
researchers (e.g., Brillinger, Jones and Tukey, 1978)
have used definitions of causal effects other than the
“ACE,” a term coined, I believe, in Holland (1986).
Also see the definitions of causal effects on quantiles
implied by PRR’s confidence intervals in his equa-
tion (1) here, which clearly do not equal the ACE.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I once again thank all three discus-
sants for their comments and hope that this package
assembled by the editorial board of Statistical Sci-
ence will lead to more work in this great research
area, much of it following up on the interesting ideas
contributed by the discussants.
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